The Influenza Pandemic (H1N1/09) virus was first reported in humans in Mexico in April 2009 and a pandemic level was declared on 11 th of June 2009 by the World Health Organization (Chan, 2009; WHO, 2009a). Public misconceptions about the transmission of H1N1/09 were caused by the inadequate naming of the disease as 'swine influenza'. This cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the outbreak in the Australian human population and before the virus was reported in the first piggery in Australia in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011) . The aims of this study were to evaluate pig producers' perceptions about the virus and the outbreak financial impact and influence on on-farm biosecurity practices. A questionnaire was designed and posted to Australian Pork Limited (APL) members (n = 460), obtaining responses from 182 producers (39.6%). Pig producers had good general knowledge on potential transmission pathways for H1N1/09 between people, with direct or close contact with a sick person perceived as the most likely pathways. Changes on biosecurity practices, such as asking visitors if they had recently been overseas (27.8%) and not allowing any visitor to inspect their pigs (18.3%), were reported among respondents. In addition, approximately 40% of producers asked their employees to notify flu like symptoms, consulted a veterinarian on H1N1/09 and visited websites to seek information on H1N1/09. A higher adoption of these practices was observed among large (> 100 sows) than small herds. Only 2.9% of 2 | P a g e respondents reported a reduction in pig sales during the outbreak. However, approximately one third of producers reported being financially and emotionally stressed, 38.2% were distressed about the health of their pigs and 16.7% about their own health. The most important sources of information were APL (93%), veterinarians (89%) and the state Department of Primary Industries (DPI) (75%). The first two considered the most trusted sources of information. Television, radio and other farmers were considered more important sources of information by small herds and veterinarians by larger herds. Producers believed that the H1N1/09 outbreak was better managed by the pork industry (89.9%) than by the health authorities (58.8%), and the on-going communication with APL was the main strength of the outbreak management. Communication and extension programs in future outbreaks should consider the needs of all sectors of the pig industry to increase their effectiveness.
Introduction
In April 2009, Influenza Pandemic (H1N1/09), a novel H1N1 influenza A virus, was isolated in Mexico (WHO, 2009a) . In the following two months, the virus spread rapidly among the human population worldwide and on 11th of June 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic alert level (Chan, 2009; WHO, 2009a) . By July 2010, the H1N1/09 virus had caused more than 18,000 deaths (WHO, 2000b) . The H1N1/09 virus is a reassortant with at least three parents, containing genes from swine, avian and human influenza viruses (Gibbs et al., 2009; Kou et al., 2009) , which originated in humans. Although no link between an animal and the first human cases has been established (Vallat, 2009 ), the disease was named 'swine influenza' or 'swine flu' from the start of the outbreak. This, together with the lack of available information on the epidemiology of the disease and the excessive and sometimes ill-informed media coverage, caused public misconceptions about the transmission of H1N1 to humans (Lau et al., 2009 (Lau et al., , 2011 Dhand et al., 2011) . Public perceptions on the H1N1/09 outbreak and the transmission of the virus have been previously investigated (Goodwin et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2009; Dhand et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2011) . The most common misconceptions on the transmission of the virus were: airborne spread across long-distances and transmission via eating cooked pork and handling uncooked pork. These perceptions had a significant impact on the pig industry, with unjustified bans on imports of pigs and pig products and destruction of all pig populations in some countries (Vallat, 2009) . This happened despite a joint statement on the safety of pork and pork products released by the WHO, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (Vallat, 2009) . Goodwin et al. (2009) reported that 7% of respondents of a survey in Europe had either reduced or stopped eating pork. Similarly, 11.1% of the people surveyed in the Greater Sydney area reported changing their pork eating habits due to the outbreak, including 5.2% who stopped eating all pig meat products (Dhand et al., 2011) . Market research conducted during the H1N1/09 pandemic indicated a 6% decline in consumer preference for pork after the outbreak (APL, 2009) . The first confirmed case of H1N1/09 virus infection in commercial pigs was in Alberta (Canada) in late April 2009 (OIE, 2009a; Wong et al., 2011) . In Australia, the first H1N1/09 infection of commercial pigs occurred in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011) . Although the effect of the H1N1/09 pandemic on the pig industry has been investigated to some extent, perceptions of pig producers regarding the pandemic and its effect on on-farm biosecurity practices have not been previously studied. This study, conducted at the height of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans and before the first piggery infection in Australia, aimed to investigate: (a) pig producers' perceptions about the transmission of the H1N1/09 virus; (b) the impact of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans on their enterprises; (c) the sources of information used by producers regarding the H1N1/09 outbreak; and, (d) pig producers' opinions about the management of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans. Results from this study may be used to inform management and communication strategies in future outbreak events affecting the pig industry.
Material and methods
Pig producers' perceptions of the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak in humans were investigated in a study among Australian Pork Limited (APL) members, the representative body of the pig industry in Australia. The study was conducted during the height of the H1N1/09 pandemic in humans in Australia (June and July 2009) and before the first outbreak was reported in pigs. The experimental procedures used for this study were approved by the Human Ethics Committee of The University of Sydney, Australia (Approval #06-2009/11932).
Questionnaire design
A questionnaire was developed with the aim of investigating pig producers' perceptions about the H1N1/09 pandemic in humans. The questionnaire, written in English, consisted of 5 pages with 19 questions, including open (n = 6), semi-closed (n = 7) and closed (n = 6) questions. Questions were written in a simple and clear format to minimize confusion and maximize accuracy of response (Dohoo et al., 2003; Thrusfield, 2005) . Topics covered in the questionnaire included producers' perceptions about the transmission of the virus, the financial impact of the outbreak on their enterprises, the influence of the outbreak on their on-farm biosecurity practices, sources of information used by producers during the outbreak and their opinions about management of the outbreak. The questionnaire was piloted with three pig producers and subsequently modified to improve understanding prior to distribution. Completion time for the questionnaire was estimated at 10 minutes. A copy of the questionnaire is available from the corresponding author on request.
Distribution of questionnaires
A census approach among members of APL was used for the selection of survey participants as the APL register is the only national database of pig producers in Australia. Questionnaire packs, containing a covering letter, a participant information sheet and a self-addressed, postage paid return envelope were sent to members via APL, to maintain confidentiality. A proposed second mailout was cancelled following the first outbreak of H1N1/09 in a piggery in Australia as it was felt this event would have significantly impacted the producers' responses compared to the first mail-out conducted pre-outbreak. Twenty producers were randomly selected to receive a $50 gift voucher as an incentive to participate.
Data Management and analysis
Responses from the returned questionnaires were entered in Microsoft Access (Microsoft, PC/Windows XP, 2006, Redmond, WA, USA) and checked for data entry errors. The SAS statistical program (© 2002 -2003 Inc., Cary, NC, USA) was used for the descriptive and statistical analysis. Frequency tables were created for the descriptive analysis of the data for the following outcome variables: 1) producers' interest in information about the H1N1/09 outbreak; 2) their opinion on the importance of different sources of information on animal health issues related to the H1N1/09 outbreak; 3) their perceptions about the activities likely to pose a risk of disease transmission; 4) changes in biosecurity practices applied on-farm during the H1N1/09 outbreak; 5) their level of stress due to the H1N1/09 outbreak (financial, emotional and about their own health and the health of their pigs); 6) their opinion on the likelihood of an outbreak of H1N1/09 occurring in pigs in Australia; 7) their perception of their preparedness to prevent or control an H1N1/09 outbreak in their piggery; 8) their perception of the stringency of their farm's hygiene and disease prevention practices; and 9) their opinion on how the H1N1/09 outbreak situation was managed by the health authorities and the pork industry. Associations of these variables with age, gender, location (New South Wales, NSW; Queensland, QLD; South Australia, SA; Tasmania, TAS; Victoria, VIC; and, Western Australia, WA) and herd size were initially investigated through contingency tables and univariable logistic regression analysis using the SAS LOGISTIC procedure assisted by UniLogistic macro (Dhand, 2010) . Categories of explanatory variables are described in Table 1 . Most of the outcome variables were ordinal with five categories but were transformed to binary variables for conducting binomial logistic regression analysis based on agreement or disagreement in relation to the question statement (i.e. extremely, very and moderately likely compared to very and extremely unlikely).
If the explanatory variables were associated with the outcome during the univariable analysis at 10% level (i.e. P < 0.1), then multivariable logistic regression models were constructed using the SAS LOGISTIC procedure by including the significant explanatory variables to further evaluate their associations after adjusting for each other. Significant variables with a P-value <0.05 in the multivariable model were retained in the final model. However, age and gender were forced into all the final models as potential confounders. Qualitative data from two of the open questions were analysed using content analysis to identify thematic categories (Franzosi, 2004) . These questions investigated producers' opinions on the strengths of the outbreak management and opportunities for improvement. Responses to each of these questions were read three times to ensure familiarity with the data prior to coding by themes. An interpretive coding of the responses was used, being driven by the data itself and not by predetermined categories (Franzosi, 2004) . Responses were then grouped together by thematic categories and frequency distributions calculated. Five categories were created for the qualitative open question on the description of the clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs, according to the clinical signs identified by producers in comparison to a set of seven common clinical signs of swine influenza described by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2009c) . This set of clinical signs included general clinical signs (fever, lethargy and weight loss) and specific respiratory clinical signs (laboured breathing, nasal discharge, coughing and sneezing). Categories were: 1. 'Don't know' response; 2. Less than three clinical signs; 3. Between three and four clinical signs; 4. Five or more clinical signs; and, 5. Other clinical signs. This last category included responses that did not include any of the common clinical signs.
Results

Response rate and general information about respondents
The questionnaire was distributed among 460 APL members and 182 responses were obtained (39.6% response rate). Of respondents who provided information on age and gender (180/182), 72.8% were males and 27.2% were females. Among these producers, 74.4% were over 44 years of age, of which 22.4% were over 65 years of age. Distribution of respondents by location and herd size is shown in Figure 1 . Among producers with available information on location and herd size (172/182), 39% had 0 to 99 sows, 38% had 100 to 499 sows, 9% had 500 to 999 and 14% had more than 1,000 sows. Most producers housed their pigs (breeding stock and progeny) indoors (63.9%), followed by indoor housing with bedding (ecoshelters) for growing pigs (25.2%), and outdoor housing in pens or paddocks for breeding stock (16%). Table 2 shows producers' perceptions about activities likely to pose a risk of contracting H1N1/09. Most producers believed that travelling on public transport with a sick person present (93.9%) and shaking hands with a sick person (89.8%) were the most likely activities posing risk of contracting the virus. Other activities identified as potential sources of contracting the virus were attending a community gathering (76.3%) and swimming in a community pool (32.0%). Eating cooked pork and drinking tap water were the activities perceived as least likely to pose a risk of H1N1 transmission (0.6% and 2.9%, respectively). Age, gender and herd size were not significantly associated with these perceptions.
Producers' perceptions on the H1N1/09 outbreak 2.2.1. Risk of contracting H1N1/09
Risk of an outbreak of H1N1/09 occurring in pigs
A large proportion of producers (63.1%) believed an H1N1/09 outbreak in piggeries in Australia was likely to occur (moderately to extremely likely); however, 36.9% of respondents had the perception that an outbreak in pigs was very or extremely unlikely. Regarding preparedness to prevent and control a potential outbreak of H1N1/09 in pigs, most producers (81.2%) believed they were somewhat to very well prepared. Over half of respondents (59.7%) believed their farm's hygiene and disease prevention practices were stringent. However, over a third rated their practices as only average (36.4%), or worse (4.0%). No significant differences were observed on these variables according to age, gender, herd size or location of the piggery during the univariable logistic analysis. However, women (89.4%) tended (P = 0.074) to believe they were better prepared for preventing and controlling an outbreak than men (78.0%).
Clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs
A total of 144 (79.1%) producers responded to the open question on the clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs. Of these, 11 producers (7.6%) did not know any of the clinical signs of swine influenza and 36.1% stated less than three clinical signs. Approximately half of producers were able to state more than three clinical signs (41.0% between three and four; and 8.3% five or more). In addition, 10 producers (6.9%) stated other clinical signs. Producers in this last group provided nonspecific clinical signs ('similar to human flu', 'similar to other respiratory diseases in pigs', 'sudden death').
Management of the outbreak 2.2.4.1. Quantitative results on the effectiveness of the management:
The questionnaire investigated pig producers' perceptions on the management of the outbreak by the health authorities and the pork industry. Most producers (89.9%) believed the outbreak was managed appropriately by the pork industry. However, a significant proportion of producers (42.2%) thought the outbreak was poorly managed by the health authorities. Perceptions of outbreak management by the health authorities and the pork industry differed according to the location of the piggery. A higher proportion of producers from NSW (64.7%; P = 0.021) compared to those in SA (40.0%; OR 0.36, 95% CI 0.15 -0.87) believed the outbreak was well managed by the health authorities. Similarly, more producers in NSW (96.1%) than in QLD (78.8%; OR 0.15, 95% CI 0.02 -0.68) considered that the outbreak was well managed by the pork industry. No significant differences in the perception of outbreak management were observed according to age, gender or herd size.
Qualitative results on the strengths and weaknesses of the management of the outbreak:
Of the participants, 92 (50.5%) responded to the question regarding the strengths of the outbreak management and five main themes were identified. A proportion of producers (24/92; 26.1%) identified the on-going communication and information delivery from APL as the main strength of the outbreak management. Moreover, some producers (17/92; 18.5%) believed the strength of the outbreak management was the readily available information from government and general media. A similar proportion of producers (18/92; 19.6%) described as strength the increased awareness of the general public and pig producers on the importance of biosecurity following the outbreak. Eight producers (8.7%) believed the management of the outbreak improved preparedness for potential future outbreaks; and nine producers (9.8%) thought that airport security, control of entry and quarantine measures applied were the main strength of the outbreak management. A total of 130 producers responded to the qualitative open question about what could have been done to improve the management of the outbreak. Among respondents, 47 (36.2%) indicated that using an appropriate name of the disease, instead of 'Swine Influenza', would have improved the management of the outbreak. Some producers (33/130; 25.4%) believed the information available to the public as well as that provided to pig producers was not accurate. A general comment was the lack of appropriate information on the safety of the consumption of pork products. Twenty-one producers (16.2%) indicated that the media coverage was unnecessarily alarmist and provided misleading information. A similar number of producers (24/131; 18.5%) indicated that the control measures applied to incoming overseas travellers into Australia were not stringent enough. A lower proportion of producers (7/130; 5.4%) believed that the outbreak could have been better managed if more resources were allocated to vaccine manufacturing and distribution.
Impacts of the human pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak
Biosecurity practices
Producers were asked to identify those biosecurity practices applied on-farm before and during the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans from a list of practices provided in the questionnaire. Regarding this question, three options were provided: 1. Practice was already applied before the outbreak; 2.
Practice was adopted during the outbreak; and, 3. Practice not applied (before or during). Table 3 describes these practices and producers' responses on their use before and during the H1N1/09 outbreak. Moderate to high levels of biosecurity practices applied on farm before the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans were identified among respondents. However, some of the biosecurity practices applied on-farm differed according to herd size, with higher level of biosecurity compliance observed among larger farms (Table 4) .
Changes in producers' practices due to the H1N1/09 outbreak (practices that were adopted after the outbreak began) were observed in those practices related to the potential risk of disease introduction posed by visitors (Table 3 ). The most significant change was observed for producers asking visitors if they had recently been overseas (27.8%) and producers not allowing any visitor to inspect their pigs (18.3%). A lower proportion of producers adopted the practice of having a controlled entry of visitors (7.3%) and making visitors to wash their hands and scrub their fingernails (8.6%) due to the H1N1/09 outbreak occurring.
Activities and practices adopted by producers in response to the H1N1/09 outbreak and associations of these practices with herd size are shown in Table 5 . A similar proportion of producers stated asking their employees to notify if they or any people in their close contacts had flu like symptoms (44.0%), consulting a veterinarian or a pig health specialist on H1N1/09 (37.9%) and visiting websites to seek information on H1N1/09 (41.8%). A lower proportion (9.3%) reported attending a meeting or an information session on influenza. For all practices, a significantly higher adoption was observed among farms with more than 100 sows than among smaller farms.
Level of stress
Only five producers, representing 2.9% of respondents, reported a reduction in pig sales during the outbreak of H1N1/09 in humans. Approximately one third of producers (32.8%) reported being financially stressed (moderately to extremely) during the outbreak. Similarly, 26.7% of producers felt emotionally distressed. Interestingly, more producers were distressed about the health of their pigs (38.2%) than about their own health (16.7%). The only significant difference (P = 0.028) observed was on the level of stress about the health of the pigs according to the farm location. Those producers from NSW and SA were less stressed (26.0% moderately to extremely stressed) about the health of their pigs than producers from QLD (48.5%), VIC/TAS (48.6%) and WA (54.2%).
Sources of information
Producers were asked whether they were interested in information on the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans and the animal health issues of the outbreak. The vast majority of producers were moderately to extremely interested in the information about the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans (82%) and the animal health issues of the outbreak (90%). Results in relation to sources of information are shown in Table 6 . The most important sources of information (sources considered moderately to extremely important) according to producers were APL (93%), veterinarians (89%) and the state Department of Primary Industries (DPI) (75%). However, differences on importance of some sources of information were observed according to herd size, location of the farm and gender of respondents. Results of the multivariable logistic regression models are shown in Table 7 .
Results indicate that television, radio and other farmers were considered more important sources of information by farmers managing smaller herds, while veterinarians were considered more important by farmers managing larger herds. Moreover, internet was considered more important (P = 0.046) by females (75.6%) than males (58.5%). No significant differences were observed regarding the importance of APL, DPI and the Federal government as sources of information between the tested explanatory variables. Producers were asked about their most trusted information source in relation to animal health issues of the H1N1/09 outbreak in an open question. Among respondents (n = 171), APL was mentioned as the most trusted source of information by 62.6% of producers, followed by veterinarians (45.6%). Only 11.6% of producers mentioned the state DPI as one of the most trusted source of information. The proportion of producers who mentioned veterinarians differed according to herd size (P = 0.01), with fewer small producers (< 99 sows) stating this option compared to larger producers (> 100 sows) (26.3% and 57.0%, respectively).
Discussion
Several studies have investigated public perceptions about the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 (Goodwin et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2009; Dhand et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2011) ; however, limited information is available on pig producers' perceptions and experiences (Goodwin et al., 2011) . This cross-sectional observational study was conducted at the height of the outbreak in the human population in Australia and before the virus was reported for the first time in an Australian piggery in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011) . The survey population (APL members) included 460 producers among an estimated total 1,351 pig producers in Australia (APL, 2010). There is potential bias in the study population towards more progressive producers; however the research team considered this to be the best approach for reaching the higher number of producers in a short period of time.
A survey response rate of 39.6% is considered low to moderate, but is considerably higher than rates obtained in other single mail-out surveys among pig producers in Australia (Pearson et al., 2008, 11.3%; Schembri, 2009, 29%) . Response rates for postal, self-completed questionnaires tend to be relatively low (10-50%), depending on the study sponsor, the nature of the respondent population, the subject and aim of the study and the length of the questionnaire (Thrusfield, 2007) . Moreover, response rates in epidemiologic surveys have been declining worldwide in the last 30 years with more significant declines in the last decade (Galea and Tracy, 2007) . The low to moderate response rate achieved in the current study could have biased study results although the bias is not caused by the low response rate per se. Bias occurs if respondents are systematically different from nonrespondents, which does not appear to be the case in this study. Among respondents, most producers (77%) had less than 500 sows, which is a similar proportion to that estimated among all Australian pig producers (71%) (APL, 2010) . Moreover, the distribution of respondents by state aligns with the distribution of all pig producers in Australia (NSW 26%, QLD 21%, SA 18%, VIC 22%, WA 12% and TAS 1%) (APL, 2010). These similarities with the known pig producer population in Australia support the validity and representativeness of the results of this survey. Pig producers had good general knowledge on potential transmission pathways for H1N1/09 between people (Table 2 ). Producers believed that most H1N1/09 was transmitted through direct or close contact with a sick person. Similar perceptions were reported among pig producers in Malaysia, who believed that avoiding crowds and contact with infected people were effective ways of protection against H1N1/09 infection (Goodwin et al., 2011) . Perceptions on transmission pathways among pig producers were also similar to those reported by the general public in the Greater Sydney area (Dhand et al., 2011) . However, a much lower proportion of pig producers than general public had misperceptions about ways of contracting H1N1/09. As expected, a very low proportion of pig producers believed that eating cooked pork (0.6%) and handling uncooked pig meat (1.7%) could pose a risk for contracting H1N1/09; while these proportions among the general public were 15.6% and 22.8%, respectively (Dhand et al., 2011) . In agreement with these elevated risk perceptions of the general public, a study on public perceptions of H1N1/09 in Hong Kong, reported 7% of respondents believed that eating well-cooked pork posed a risk of transmission of the virus. These public misperceptions had a negative impact on pork consumption, with a reduced consumption reported by 6% to 11% of different survey respondents (APL, 2009; Goodwin et al., 2009; Dhand et al., 2011) . Despite this, a very low proportion of pig producers stated a decreased number of pigs sold during the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans. The potential economic impact on pig enterprises of incorrectly associating pork products with the risk of infection, and the on-going communication and information delivery from APL, could have enhanced pig producers' knowledge on H1N1/09 potential transmission pathways, although it would appear that equivalent communications from various sources to the public may have been less successful. A proportion of producers stated being more stressed about the health of their pigs than about their own health, and over 60% of producers believed an outbreak of H1N1/09 in pigs was likely to occur. Interestingly, the first H1N1/09 outbreak in a piggery in Australia was reported in the following weeks after this study was conducted (OIE, 2009b) . Producers' concerns about their own health were more significant among pig producers in Malaysia (Goodwin et al., 2011) than among pig producers in Australia. Differences in producers' demographics and level of knowledge on H1N1/09 and the management of the outbreak between countries could be some of the reasons for the difference in risk perception. Moreover, most producers in the current study believed they had stringent disease prevention practices and were well prepared to prevent and control an outbreak in pigs. However, a significant proportion of producers identified less than three clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs and some stated not knowing the clinical signs caused by the disease. The lack of information on the epidemiology of H1N1/09 infection in pigs and the free-status of 'classical' swine influenza among pigs in Australia could have influenced these producers' perceptions and knowledge. Although moderate to high level of on-farm biosecurity practices before the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans were identified among respondents, this level, as expected, was higher among larger herds. Previous research suggested that small-scale pig producers had poorer on-farm biosecurity practices, poorer disease knowledge and understanding of swill feeding, and limited veterinary contact (Schembri et al., 2006; Schembri, 2009; Van Metre et al., 2009) . Some of the practices that should be improved, especially among smaller farms, are keeping records of farm visitors and training of piggery workers in emergency disease recognition. External validity of the level of onfarm biosecurity practices to the whole pig industry should be considered with caution, as more APL members than non-members might have an on-farm quality assurance program, which could indicate better on-farm biosecurity. The biosecurity changes reported during the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans were those to prevent H1N1/09 introduction through piggery visitors. In addition, some activities such as consultation with a veterinarian, visiting websites and asking employees to notify flu-like symptoms, were adopted after the outbreak began. These activities were also more prevalent among larger farms. Most pig producers reported being interested in information about the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans and the potential for animal disease. Veterinarians were considered to be important information sources by producers with larger herds, whilst other sources of information (television, radio and other farmers), were more important among producers with smaller herds. Information received by small-scale pig producers might be less accurate than that received by large-scale producers. A previous study among pig producers trading at livestock markets in Australia, reported a similar trend, with large-scale producers (> 150 sows) considering the veterinarian and APL the most useful sources of information, while small-scale producers were reluctant to approach APL and the state DPI and preferred seeking advice from other producers, family and friends (Schembri, 2009) . Stone (2005) and Maller and Carr (2007) described two categories of valid sources of information, trusted sources, such as veterinarians, rural suppliers and friends, and independent authorities, such as internet, government and magazines. Although the latter category has been linked to small landholder's willingness to learn, small landholders' generally held a negative perception of government. In previous studies in Australia, small-scale pig producers tended to associate government with punitive measures (Schembri, 2009) . Similarly, it has been suggested that small landholders rely on their own experiences and those of their neighbours and friends, rather than seeking advice from government and are not considered to be part of the mainstream production and industry groups (Sanson and Fairweather, 2004; Maller and Carr, 2007) . Confidence and trust in individuals and information services have been proven to be generated through historic links and positive and reliable relationships (McKenzie J. , 2007) . Unlike other studies that suggest that women are more likely to be interested in and seek information regarding health issues (Kassulke et al., 1993; Taylor, 2009 ), gender differences in interest on H1N1/09 information were not observed. The only significant gender difference noted in this section was that women considered the internet a more important information source than men. Producers believed that the H1N1/09 outbreak was better managed by the pork industry than by the health authorities, with praise for APL as a source for reliable information compared to perceived inaccuracies in broader public media sources. As Briggs and Nichter (2009) indicated, politicians and health authorities during the H1N1/09 outbreak opted for two rhetorical moves, raising alarm and reassuring the public at the same time. This approach might have contributed to the perceptions of inaccuracy of the information delivered. Moreover, the incorrect naming of the disease as 'swine flu' was a major concern among pig producers. During the initial days of the outbreak, WHO used the name of 'swine flu' in their press briefs, stating that the virus was a swine influenza virus. However, pressure from the pork industry due to direct consequences of the incorrect naming, changed WHO's position and since 30 April 2009 the agency had not mentioned this name in any official statement (Enserink, 2009) . Despite this change in position and a joint statement on the safety of pork by the WHO, OIE and FAO, the outbreak caused a significant impact on the pig industry (Vallat, 2009 ). Findings of this study indicate that pig producers had good understanding and perceptions of the potential risks of contracting H1N1/09 and fewer misconceptions than the general public. Producers were concerned about the health of their pigs and the outbreak in humans caused an improvement in those biosecurity practices preventing the transmission of the virus from humans to pigs. The industry body was in general considered the most important and trusted source of information; however, this study identified differences on the trusted sources of information among large and small-scale pig producers. Communication and extension programs in future outbreaks should consider the needs of all sectors of the pig industry to increase their effectiveness.
